



The Potential for Cooperation in Shared Fisheries 
– Theory and Application to Vietnam’s Fisheries 






Le Kim Long 
A dissertation for the degree of philosophiae doctor 
 
UNIVERSITY OF TROMSØ 
Norwegian College of Fishery Science 









The Potential for Cooperation in Shared Fisheries 
 – Theory and Application to Vietnam’s Fisheries 















A dissertation for the degree of philosophiae doctor 
 
UNIVERSITY OF TROMSØ 
Norwegian College of Fishery Science 






This dissertation is for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Social Science, at the 
Norwegian College of Fishery Science, University of Tromso. I have benefited from the 
cooperation, help and support of many people and institutions for my PHD work. 
 
The most important institutions: 
The Quota scholarship programme, a funding scheme sponsored by the Norwegian 
Ministry of Education and Research, which gave me a PHD-scholarship for my study at the 
Norwegian College of Fishery Science. 
The Norad SRV 2701 Project, which gave me financial support for the data collection 
of fishing vessels in Nha Trang, Vietnam. 
The NOMA-FAME programme, which provided me with a chance to practice lecturing 
to MSc students of Fisheries and Aquaculture Economics and Management.   
The Nordic Marine Academy, which provided me with a chance to follow an advanced 
course, ‘Game Theory and Fisheries’ in Helsinki. This course has inspired me, during my 
study, of the potential for cooperation in shared fisheries. 
The Norwegian College of Fishery Science (NCFS), particularly two departments of 
the NCFS including (i) the Department of Economics and Management and (ii) the Center 
for Marine Resource Management, where the working environment has been very good.        
The International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade (IIFET), which provided 
me a chance to present my work at the IIFET Conference in Nha Trang, 2008.          
Nha Trang University, my home university, which allowed me to follow these studies. 
 
The most important people: 
My supervisor and co-author, Prof. Ola Flaaten, who has made a great effort to support 
me in my PHD. His profound comments have been really helpful, not only in completing this 
study but also in improving my methodology for fisheries economic study. I am very much 
indebted to him, not only for his close supervision but also for his kind, unreserved devotion 
to my study. 
My co-author, Associate Prof. Nguyen Thi Kim Anh, the Dean of the Economics 
Faculty, Nha Trang University and her team, for collecting and providing data of longliners 
in Nha Trang.  
Eirik Mikkelsen, Mallory Powell, Kjell G. Salvanes, Frode Skjold  and anonymous 
reviewers for their helpful comments on previous drafts. 
Lecturers and participants at the course of ‘Game Theory and Fisheries’ organised by 
the Nordic Marine Academy in Helsinki, 2007 as well as participants at the IIFET 
Conference in Nha Trang, 2008 for their comments and encouragements. 
Good colleagues and friends at all the institutions above, who have supported and 
helped me in so many ways.  
My family; my wife Thanh Binh and our very beautiful daughter, Thanh Mai, who has 
been very supportive during my PHD studies and has been patient while I was away from 
home. 
Nha Trang, March 2009 




Preface              i 






Part 1: The potential for cooperation in straddling stock fisheries….……………......5 
 
Paper I:  Regional fisheries management organization with an endogenous minimum 
participation level for cooperation in straddling stock fisheries 
Paper II:  A Stackelberg analysis of the potential for cooperation in straddling stock 
fisheries 
 
Part 2: Shared fisheries in the South China Sea and suggestion for Vietnam’s 
fisheries strategy………………………………………………………………...11 
 
Paper III: Economic performance of open-access fisheries: the case of Vietnam’s   
longliners in the South China Sea 
Paper IV:  On the shared fisheries in the South China Sea and possible strategies for 
Vietnam’s fisheries  
 




List of papers 
Paper I:  Regional fisheries management organization with an endogenous minimum 
participation level for cooperation in straddling stock fisheries. Fisheries 
Research 2009 (forthcoming). 
  
Paper II:  A Stackelberg analysis of the potential for cooperation in straddling stock 
fisheries. Submitted to a journal. The Best Student Paper Award at the 
International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trading (IIFET), Nha 
Trang, Vietnam, 2008.  
 
Paper III: Economic performance of open-access fisheries: the case of Vietnam’s 
longliners in the South China Sea. Fisheries Research 2008, 93, pp 296–304. 
 
Paper IV: On the shared fisheries in the South China Sea and possible strategies for 





Since the end of the 20th century, many shared fish stocks throughout the world have been 
found in extreme danger of collapse. There are many calls for cooperation in utilizing and 
conserving the shared fish resources including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea and the 1995 UN Fish Stock Agreement. This study provides an important rationale for 
cooperation in utilizing a shared fish stock with several interested parties. The rationale is 
that an increase in the cooperation level leads to an increase not only in the steady-state fish 
stock, but also in total rent of the fishery. Moreover, the possibilities for cooperation in 
utilizing shared fisheries are examined. Some measures are also proposed to improve the 
cooperation level. According to this study, the prospects of cooperation in utilizing a 
straddling fish stock are not unlikely if a Regional Fishery Management Organisation 
(RFMO) forms with a leading role in a Stackelberg game or with an endogenous minimum 
participation level in a Cournot game. However, if the cost of enforcing RFMO members’ 
compliance with the terms of the agreement is high enough, there may not be any incentive 
for fishing countries to establish an RFMO for managing a straddling fish stock. This is one 
of the reasons for pervasive over-fishing around the world. For an actual example, the South 
China Sea (SCS) fishery, which is harvested by about ten countries including Vietnam, will 
be discussed as an application. An empirical investigation of the profitability and 
remuneration of an offshore long-line fishery demonstrates slightly above-average earnings 
even under the current open-access regime. Finally, the study will propose some fishery 
strategies for Vietnam, which is a country with heavy inshore fishing, the second largest 





Internationally, shared fish resources account for as much as one-third of the world marine 
capture fish harvest (Munro, Van Houtte and Willmann 2004). Many shared fish stocks 
throughout the world have been found in extreme danger of collapse since the end of the 
20th century. The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS), came into force in 
1994 and set new legal frameworks for marine fisheries and environmental protection (UN 
1982). Besides the definition of exclusive economic zone (EEZ), the LOS has called for 
cooperation in managing the shared fish resources of high seas and semi-closed seas (UN 
1982). Moreover, the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA) came into force in 2001; 
this is an implementation agreement for the LOS with respect to the conservation and 
management of one type of shared fish stocks – straddling and highly migratory fish stocks 
(UN 1995). The UNFSA provides for an implementation framework for Articles 63 and 64 
and relevant provisions of the LOS. At the heart of the UNFSA is the establishment of the 
Regional Fishery Management Organisations (RFMOs) to manage straddling and highly 
migratory fish stocks. The RFMOs and its arrangements were recognized as the primary 
mechanism for international cooperation in conserving and managing straddling fish stocks 
and highly migratory fish stocks.  
 
The exploitation of a fish stock, shared by a limited number of fishing countries, involves 
strategic choices. Before 1993, the theory of fishing games considered cases of just two 
players (see e.g. Kaitala (1986), Munro (1991), Sumaila (1999) and Lindroos et al. (2007) for 
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reviews). Munro (1979) and Clark (1976) were the first to provide an analysis of a fishing 
game with two players. They demonstrated that cooperation in utilizing a shared fishery 
leads to both higher fish stock and total rent of the fishery. For an application, Armstrong 
and Flaaten (1991) showed that there is a significant cooperative surplus for the case of 
Arcto-Norwegian cod-stock sharing between Norway and Russia. However, many important 
stocks in the EEZs are shared by two or more coastal states and the straddling of some fish 
stocks outside the EEZs means they are accessible by fleets of any nationality (Hannesson 
1997). Kaitala and Munro (1993), Kaitala and Munro (1995), Bjorndal et al. (2000) and 
Bjorndal and Munro (2007) have considered the management issues of a shared fish stock 
with several interested parties. The last decade has produced literature using the cooperative 
approach to deal with the potential of cooperation when three or more countries utilize a fish 
stock. For example, Kaitala and Lindroos (1998) and Lindroos (2004) use the characteristic 
function game to obtain fair-sharing solutions of surplus benefits from full cooperation. Once 
the number of players exceeds two, however, the possibility of sub-coalitions forming among 
players arises. Therefore, the non-cooperative approach is also needed to understand the 
possibility of cooperation in utilizing shared fish stock with several fishing countries. On the 
other hand, literature examining cooperative and non-cooperative consequences of a shared 
fishery adopts both dynamic and static games (see e.g. Paper (II) for a review). Kaitala and 
Lindroos (2007) argued that the advantage of static games over dynamic games is that 
analytical results are easier to derive and interpret. Moreover, since the static approach gives 
a good long-term prediction, it is consistent with the calls for cooperation of the LOS and the 
UNFSA to sustain long-term stability of shared fish stocks. Thus, the first part of this study 
will focus on the theoretical aspects of the potential for cooperation when several fishing 
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countries are involved in a shared fish stock within the non-cooperative framework of static 
fishing games. 
 
The second part of this study concentrates on the South China Sea (SCS), where the marine 
resources are harvested by about ten countries – an actual example of utilizing shared fish 
resources with several interested parties. Currently, the SCS fisheries are open-access and 
over-fishing is a serious problem (UNEP 2005). Since the SCS is a semi-closed sea, any 
changes in the ecosystem of this semi-enclosed sea will have a considerable impact on the 
whole SCS. The fish resources in the SCS area are generally recognized as migrating from 
one EEZ to another and also to international waters, particular the pelagic species such as 
tuna, mackerel and scads (see ICLARM/ISEAS 1978). Hence, the question may arise as to 
whether each country’s management policy of these fish stocks is effective.  
 
Moreover, the SCS is one of the world’s most contentious areas in both maritime boundary 
and territorial disputes (Wang 2001). The establishment of EEZs increases the possibility for 
overlapping territorial claims in this sea. Countries in the SCS have tried to establish 
settlements – in most cases, military outposts – on the small rocky islets of Spratly Islands 
and Paracel Islands, in order to set up unique territorial claims to both an EEZ and a 
continental shelf. This leads to territorial overlapping margins, and various conflicts of 
sovereignty. Territorial issues are mainly in the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands, 
which not only are believed to contain oil and gas deposits, but also are rich fishing grounds. 
There are six countries involved in these disputes, including Vietnam. It would be preferable 
for them to initiate cooperation from the least complicated items (SCSW 1999). Wang 
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(2001) proposed that fisheries cooperation can serve as a viable starting point, from which 
the cooperation experience can spill over into other areas of cooperation.  
 
When countries sharing a fishery have different fishing situations, especially fishing cost, 
their optimum conditions of the fishery are different. Moreover, each country should have 
suitable strategies for each future scenario of the SCS fishery, such as the continuation of the 
status quo or a move towards cooperation.  For an example, some fishery strategies of 
Vietnam, the country with heavy inshore fishing, the second largest catch in the SCS and 
large-scale illegal fishing, are proposed in both these scenarios.  Thus the second part of the 
study will deal with shared fisheries in the SCS and possible fishing strategies for Vietnam.  
 
Part 1: The potential for cooperation in straddling stock fisheries  
 
There are four non-mutually exclusive categories of shared fish stocks (see Bjørndal and 
Munro 2007). They are (i) transboundary stocks – fishery resources moving from one EEZ to 
one, or more neighbouring EEZs; (ii) highly migratory stocks (tuna primarily), which 
because of their nature, cross the EEZ boundary into the adjacent high seas where they 
become subject to exploitation by so-called distant water fishing states (DWFS); (iii) 
straddling stocks – all other fish stocks crossing the EEZ boundary into the adjacent high 
seas; (iv) discrete high seas stocks – those few stocks remaining wholly in the high seas (see 
Bjørndal and Munro 2007). Since the UNFSA focuses on managing highly migratory stock 
fisheries and straddling stock fisheries, category (ii) and (iii) will be considered in this part of 
the study and are simply called, straddling fish stock (see also Bjørndal and Munro 2007). 
5 
 
According to Article 8 of the UNFSA, only member states of RFMOs and states that apply 
the fishing restrictions adopted by them shall have access to the regulated fishery resources. 
The UNFSA is, however, binding only upon those states that are party to it. As of 25 
September 2008, there are 71 states party to the UNFSA (UN 2008). Moreover, FAO (2001) 
has showed that the incidence of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing is 
pervasive over many parts of the world. Therefore, RFMOs managing a straddling fish stock 
should be modelled with the equilibrium concept of a self-enforcing or stable agreement. A 
stable agreement made between parties, proposed by D’Aspremont et al. (1983), is defined 
as a single coalition from which no member wishes to withdraw (the cooperative coalition is 
internally stable) and no non-member wishes to join (the cooperative coalition is externally 
stable).  
 
Pintassilgo and Lindroos (2006) used the static Cournot non-cooperative game combined 
with the classical Gordon–Schaefer model for several homogenous players to analyse the 
possibility for cooperation in straddling stock fisheries. They have, however, demonstrated 
that a non-cooperative solution is the inevitable outcome when there are more than two 
players and the grand coalition is a stable Nash equilibrium outcome, only if there are two 
players involved in a shared fishery. Their result raises the question of whether the 
establishment of RFMOs to manage straddling stock fisheries under the UNFSA, is stable 
and successful. Pintassilgo et al. (2008) have shown that the success of RFMOs is related to 
the level and asymmetry of harvesting costs in the static Cournot game. To investigate the 
potential for cooperation in straddling stock fisheries, Paper (I) will add the assumption of 
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establishing the RFMO with an endogenous minimum participation level within a Cournot 
game in both cases of costless and costly enforcement; alternatively, Paper (II), assumes that 
an RFMO for managing a straddling stock fishery is sophisticated and acts as a Stackelberg 
leader and that the singletons are naïve and act as the Stackelberg followers.  
 
Both papers provide an important rationale for the UNFSA’s call for cooperation in the 
utilization of a straddling fish stock. The rationale is that an increase in the cooperation level 
in straddling stock fisheries within both the Cournot game and the Stackelberg game, leads to 
an increase not only in steady-state fish stocks, but also in total rent of the fishery. This 
means that the improved level of cooperation is preferred from a social point of view, and 
this is an important rationale for the establishment of RFMOs to manage straddling stock 
fisheries. The ambition of the UNFSA is to create a duty, on all the states engaged in 
fisheries activities in waters under the management authority of an RFMO, to cooperate 
through the RFMO in the conservation of the relevant fish stocks (Örebech et al. 1998). 
Therefore, how to increase the level of cooperation and then to reach full cooperation is a 
very important question for policymakers. 
 
Full cooperation is the optimum scenario in utilizing a straddling stock fishery in both games 
since it gives not only the highest level of steady-state fish stock, but also the highest levels 
of total rent and participants’ rent. However, Paper (II) shows that there exists an incentive 
for any participant to defect from full cooperation when five or more countries are sharing a 
fish stock in a Stackelberg game. This is also found in a Cournot game when the number of 
countries involved in a straddling stock fishery is greater than two (Pintassilgo and Lindroos 
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2006). Even the restrictions set by the UNFSA – prohibiting non-member states that do not 
abide by the regime of the regional fishery organization in exploiting the fish resources – are 
binding only to those states that are party to it. Some states may refuse to be party to the 
UNFSA to gain the advantage of being free riders. This may be an explanation for the 
recommendation that the RFMO members should recognize the grave threat to the stability 
of the cooperative regime posed by IUU fishing and work vigorously towards the 
suppression and elimination of such fishing (Lodge et al. 2007). To attack this problem, FAO 
(2001) has proposed a set of voluntary International Plans of Action on IUU fishing (IPOA-
IUU). The IPOA-IUU proposes some important responsibilities of fishing countries, which 
hope to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing (see also Tsamenyi et al. 2004). 
 
Paper (I) also examines the effect of establishing an RFMO with an endogenous minimum 
participation level on cooperative possibilities in straddling stock fisheries within the 
Cournot game in both cases – costless and costly enforcement for compliance of RFMO’s 
members.  The minimum participation level for the existence of an RFMO is unanimously 
chosen by fishing countries when negotiating the establishment of the RFMO. In comparison 
with Pintassilgo and Lindroos (2006), the establishment of an RFMO with an endogenous 
minimum participation level, in the case of costless enforcement, is firstly considered in 
Paper (I). The result shows that if an RFMO forms with an endogenous minimum 
participation level, the RFMO is stable at the equilibrium of the minimum participation level 
at which this RFMO is the smallest size of a profitable coalition. In particular, full 
cooperation is a stable coalition when four or fewer countries share a fish stock. In addition, 
a stable partial cooperation with more than 80% of countries involved will exist when five 
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countries or more share a fishery. This finding contrasts with the findings of Pintassilgo and 
Lindroos (2006), who demonstrate that non-cooperation is the unavoidable outcome when 
the number of fishing countries is greater than two. The reason for the difference is that an 
RFMO only enters into force if there is a minimum participation level. This changes the 
incentives facing the fishing countries in straddling stock fisheries. 
 
If the cost of enforcing RFMO members’ compliance with the terms of agreement is not high 
enough, Paper (I) demonstrated that an RFMO, with costly enforcement, will typically 
require a greater cooperative level at the equilibrium of the minimum participation level than 
an RFMO that could be enforced without cost. As a result, if an RFMO forms with an 
endogenous minimum participation level, in the case of costly enforcement, it not only 
results in a higher level of steady-state fish stock, but it also may improve the rent of a 
participant. In addition, the bio-economic parameters and the number of countries involved 
in straddling stock fisheries have a significant effect on the set of situations at which an 
RFMO, with costly enforcement, becomes worthwhile.  
 
Paper (II) studies the potential for cooperation in straddling stock fisheries when the 
cooperative coalition of countries acts as a Stackelberg leader against the remaining 
singleton countries. It demonstrates that the outlook for cooperation is better within the 
Stackelberg game, where the cooperative coalition acts as a leader, than within the Cournot 
game in which the cooperative coalition and the singletons simultaneously maximize their 
payoffs, taking the effort levels of the others as given. In particular, when the cooperative 
coalition acts as a leader, the grand coalition is a stable Nash equilibrium outcome only if 
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there are no more than four countries involved in a straddling fish stock. In addition, there is 
always a stable partial coalition for the exploitation of a straddling fish stock when the 
number of countries involved in the fishery is more than four. At the stable equilibrium of a 
Stackelberg game, not only is the steady-state fish stock higher, but also the total resource 
rent, participants’ rent and non-participants’ rent are higher than those of the stable  
Cournot–Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, Paper (II) shows that although some fishing 
countries may not commit to cooperation because of the unregulated fishing possibility, the 
goal of expanding the cooperative coalition can be reached in a Stackelberg game by means 
of a self-financed transfer with commitments proposed by Carraro and Siniscalco (1993). 
 
Paper (II) also shows the negative effect of new entrants on the potential for cooperation if 
the new players act as singletons in a Stackelberg game. This is consistent with Pintassilgo et 
al. (2008) in the case of a Cournot game. Moreover, another important finding of Paper (II) is 
that at any cooperation level higher than or equal to its stable cooperation level, the 
participation of new players in the existing coalition leads to a higher steady-state fish stock, 
higher total rent and higher individual rent than if the new players act as singletons. This may 
be an important rationale for the suggestion of Lodge et al. (2007) that, in each RFMO, the 
members should seek means of accommodating new members, such as allowing new 
members to purchase or lease fishing rights from existing RFMO members. However, it is 
important to note that within a Stackelberg game, even if a stable coalition managing a 
straddling stock fishery with the open-membership rule exists, the new-entrant issue is still a 
problem for the conservation of this fish stock. 
 
10 
According to this study, the prospects of cooperation in utilizing a straddling fish stock are 
not unlikely if an RFMO forms with a leading role in a Stackelberg game or with an 
endogenous minimum participation level in a Cournot game. This is an important implication 
for policymakers when discussing an agreement for establishing an RFMO to manage a 
straddling fish stock. It is, however, important to note that there is an enforcement cost, 
which is levied to ensure that every member of the RMFO will comply with the terms of the 
agreement and this plays a significant role in the establishment of an RFMO. If the cost of 
enforcing RFMO members’ compliance with the terms of agreement is high enough, there 
may not be any incentive for fishing countries to establish an RFMO for managing a 
straddling fish stock. This is one of the reasons for pervasive over-fishing around the world.  
  
Part 2: Shared fisheries in the South China Sea and suggestions for Vietnam’s fisheries 
strategy 
 
It is generally recognized that the living resources in the SCS area migrate from one EEZ to 
another and also to international waters, particular the pelagic species such as tuna, mackerel 
and scads (see ICLARM/ISEAS 1978). Thus, any change in the ecosystem of this semi-
enclosed sea will have a significant impact on the whole SCS region. Currently, the SCS 
fisheries are still open-access resources for fishing vessels from more than ten countries, 
including Vietnam. The UNEP (2005) characterizes the SCS as ‘severely impacted’ in terms 
of over-fishing, with severe socio-economic and community consequences, excessive by-
catch and discards, and destructive fishing practices which include cyanide and dynamite 
fishing, and the use of small-meshed nets. Morton (2003) mentioned that the incidence of 
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IUU fishing is as pervasive, if not more pervasive, in this part of the world as it is in other 
parts of the world. This, in several cases, has created excess capacity (see e.g. Long 2003, 
Carmen et al. 2005, FAO 2005 and Khemakorn 2006). 
 
Vietnam is located in the west of the SCS with 3260 km of coastline, and an EEZ of more 
than 1 million square kilometres. Vietnam’s marine fish production has rapidly increased 
over the last two decades in parallel with a catch capacity increase. The marine catch 
amounted to about 1.6 million MT in 2003 (FAO 2005). Of the marine fish catch, 88% 
comes from the coastal fisheries and 82% of the fishers are fishing in the coastal areas. Since 
the mid-1990s, the government of Vietnam has made strenuous efforts to develop its 
offshore fisheries. The offshore fishing programme, by giving incentives for offshore fishing 
such as loans and low taxes (see e.g. Paper (III) for details), aims at attaining two broad 
policy objectives: first, to expand marine fish production for domestic consumption and for 
export; and second, to reduce the pressure on coastal fisheries resources. The non-industrial 
yellow-fin and big-eye tuna vessels of Vietnam are operating in waters of the Spratly Islands 
and the Paracel Islands where there are six countries involved in territorial disputes including 
Vietnam. Paper (III) provides an empirical study of this open-access offshore fishery in the 
disputed area of the SCS.    
 
Based on data collected through a representative sample of 32 registered offshore longliners 
operating in the SCS – representing about 16% of such vessels in Khanh Hoa, Vietnam – 
Paper (III) raises the question of whether it is necessary for direct subsidies for offshore 
longliners, such as cheap loans and low taxes. There are two main reasons for this. First, 
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Paper (III) demonstrates that vessel-owners make a profit margin of 12.1%. Moreover, crew 
members earn an opportunity income or above. In particular, the average annual crew share 
is more than 90% of the average annual income of labour in the most productive industrial 
sectors in the Khanh Hoa Province; on a monthly basis, for the average vessel with an 
operating time of 8.5 months per year, the corresponding ratio is 130%. In light of the open-
access characteristics of the fishery, the reasons for this interesting finding include (i) a risky 
longlining tuna fishery; (ii) high capital investment and operational expenses; (iii) imperfect 
national capital markets; (iv) low fishing costs compared with other countries involved in 
exploitation of this shared fish stock and (v) positive average intra-marginal rent. This gives 
a signal that the Vietnamese longline fishery for tuna may attract additional private 
investments in the near future and continue expanding.   
 
Second, Paper (III) also shows that over-investment in vessels may lead to inefficiency and 
vessels financed partly by cheap offshore project loans have hull-length longer than the level 
that maximizes annual gross revenue and income of the vessel. This is an example of how 
direct subsidy for fisheries may lead to over-investment and then inefficiency. On the other 
hand, Ruseski (1998) has warned that direct fishing subsidies may fuel an international 
fishing war among countries involved in a shared fishery. The fishing war would lead to 
excess harvesting capacity in the fishery (see e.g. OECD 2003). In light of this, it is 
suggested that each country’s management policy of a shared fish stock is inefficient.  
 
There are many calls for cooperation in utilizing fish resources in the SCS, a semi-closed sea 
(see e.g. ICLARM/ISEAS 1978, SCSW 1999, Wang 2001, Carmen et al. 2005 and 
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Khemakorn 2006). Currently, the SCS fisheries are, however, still open-access resources for 
fishing vessels from more than ten countries, including Thailand and Cambodia which have 
not yet ratified the LOS. Paper (IV) gives an economic analysis of the potential for 
cooperation in utilizing shared fisheries in the SCS and suggests two possible fishery 
strategies for Vietnam in both scenarios of (i) the continuation of the status quo and (ii) the 
establishment of a SCS fishing cooperative regime. To achieve this, Paper (IV) first presents 
the prominent features and fisheries of the SCS region. The legal instruments and institution 
for regional fisheries management are also reviewed.  
 
The economic analysis of the potential for cooperation in the utilization of the SCS fishery 
will be mostly based on three papers presented in this dissertation. Currently, there are about 
ten countries fishing in the SCS region. There clearly exists an incentive for jointly managing 
the SCS fisheries, since Paper (I) and Paper (II) have proved that an increase in the 
cooperation level in utilizing a shared fish stock leads to an increase in, not only steady-state 
fish stock, but also total rent. Beside territorial disputes, however, another reason for the non-
cooperative behaviour of fishing countries in the SCS is an attractive incentive to become 
free riders because a large number of countries are involved in a shared fish stock. According 
to the result of Paper (I) and (II), a stable partial cooperation in utilizing the SCS fish 
resource may exist if a regional cooperative regime forms with an endogenous minimum 
participation level in a Cournot game or with a leading role in a Stackelberg game. However, 
full cooperation in the SCS fishery only exists if all fishing countries ratify the cooperative 
agreement and then it becomes legally binding to all signatories. Moreover, to establish a 
cooperative regime, with full or partial cooperation, for the SCS fisheries, an effective 
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enforcement mechanism is necessary. It is, however, important to note that if enforcement 
cost is too high, there is no rationale for cooperation. Paper (IV) also adopts the works of 
Munro (1979), Clark (1976) and Kaitala and Lindroos (1998) to discuss an example of a 
possible cooperative regime in the disputed area of the SCS for the non-industrial yellow-fin 
and big-eye tuna fishery. 
 
Under the practical situation of the SCS, the future of its fisheries is still very difficult to 
predict. Therefore, the reactive Vietnamese strategies, in two possible scenarios of the SCS 
fisheries, are proposed. In the case of establishing a cooperative fishing regime, Vietnam 
should cooperate with the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia, which have a high capacity 
of offshore fishing, large EEZs and belong to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) and should call for sharing total allowable catch (TAC) for involved countries 
based on zonal attachments and making quota tradable. The yellow-fin and big-eye tuna non-
industrial fishery is a good example of a cooperative fishing regime in a disputed area. If the 
status quo still exists, on the one hand it would be wise for Vietnam to develop joint ventures 
with other countries, especially China and Thailand, which are mainly IUU fishers in 
Vietnamese EEZ, or to give permission for foreign vessels to fish in offshore of Vietnamese 
EEZ areas. On the other hand, it would be wise for Vietnam to enhance offshore fishing 
programmes or strategies to reduce the pressure on coastal fisheries resources through 
support that does not contribute to capacity and effort expansion, such as training fishermen 
to adopt new technology, providing information about the fish stock, forecasting weather and 
rescue and life-saving activities in high seas. However, these strategies would not limit the 
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danger of collapse in the fish stock of Vietnamese EEZ, if a regional cooperative regime did 
not exist.  
 
Concluding comments and future research 
 
The first part of this thesis considered the theoretical aspects of the potential for cooperation 
in utilizing shared fish stocks with several interested parties. Following the vein of 
Pintassilgo and Lindroos (2006), a static non-cooperative fishing game of several players 
with homogenous fishing costs and output price was adopted. The study focused on the 
question of whether the establishment of RFMOs to manage straddling stock fisheries under 
the UNFSA was stable and successful in the following two cases. The first is that an RFMO 
forms with an endogenous minimum participation level in both cases of costless and costly 
enforcement within a Cournot game (Paper (I)). The second is that an RFMO is sophisticated 
and acts as a Stackelberg leader, and the singletons are naïve and act as the Stackelberg 
followers in a Stackelberg game (Paper (II)). There are, however, a number of current topics 
in shared fisheries management that are not explicitly discussed. They include trigger threads 
for non-compliance to the terms of a cooperative agreement (see e.g. Hannesson 1997), 
heterogeneous fishing countries (Munro 1979 and Pintassilgo et al. 2008) and the fair sharing 
methods for cooperative surplus (Kaitala and Lindroos 1998).  
 
To be consistent with the UNFSA’s aim of establishing an RFMO to sustain the long-term 
stability of shared fish stocks, the static approach with a good long-term prediction is 
adopted in this study. Since a static game is a game of one period, the idea of placing trigger 
16 
threads for non-compliance in future periods into the models could not be directly adopted. 
Paper (I), however, explicitly discusses the effects of the cost of enforcing compliance with 
the terms of the agreement. Furthermore, an enforcement model that typically includes 
elements of illegal activities, punishments and probabilities of detection may also be an 
interesting topic for the future study of a static fishing game (see McEvoy and Stranlund 
2008 for an environmental game). On the other hand, Hannesson (1997) explicitly used 
reciprocal punishment strategies in which parties to an agreement may punish violators in 
future rounds in a repeated game. The idea of trigger threads for non-compliance, of course, 
may be explicitly discussed in a dynamic game of several fishing countries.  
 
Pintassilgo et al. (2008) extended Pintassilgo and Lindroos (2006) with the assumption of 
heterogeneous fishing costs of several interested countries to investigate the success and 
stability of RFMOs managing straddling stock fisheries in a Cournot game. Munro (1979) 
investigated the consequence of a dynamic fishing game for two countries with different 
fishing costs and output price and suggested the equal sharing of cooperative surplus. Kaitala 
and Lindroos (1998) discussed a fair solution for three cooperative fishing countries with 
different harvesting costs. Since fishing countries that share a fish stock with homogenous 
fishing costs and output price is assumed in this study, Paper (I) and Paper (II) implicitly 
imply equal sharing of the cooperative resource rent of the FRMO for its members. Hence, 
dealing with heterogeneous fishing costs and output price of fishing countries may be an 
extension of Paper (I) and Paper (II). A case study of more complex specifications of the 
resource rent, cost and harvest functions and dynamic analysis, may also be a natural 
extension of the present research.    
17 
 
The second part of this study was an actual example of several interested countries involved 
in a shared fish stock. It is the SCS, a semi-closed sea where the resources are harvested by 
about ten countries. However, due to lack of clear-cut information on the status of the fish 
stocks and scare fishing industry data of developing countries in the SCS, it is very difficult 
to predict the future of the SCS fishery. Therefore, the suggestions for Vietnam’s fishery 
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